This report identifies a set of policy lessons for China today drawn from the experience of financial deregulation, financial crisis, and recovery in Scandinavia during the period 1985-2000. Although there are considerable differences between the huge Chinese economy and the small Nordic countries, there are enough similarities to make lesson-drawing a worthwhile exercise. Based on the Scandinavian experience and the added complexity of China's status as a transition economy, financial reforms should strike a proper balance between being gradual (to avoid costly mistakes) and substantive (to secure efficiency gains in the longer term) with due consideration being given to initial conditions concerning regulation, taxes, and exchange rate arrangements. A well-managed process of financial deregulation requires that policymakers and market participants fully understand the linkages between financial reforms and the rest of the economy. In addition, the supervisory and management systems in the financial sector should move in step with the liberalization process.
Introduction
The 2008-09 global ªnancial crisis (GFC) has contributed to an interest in the issue of the ªnancial liberalization of China. According to one view, the ªnancial The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, not of the institutions they are associated with, and do not necessarily reºect those of the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, its Council of Advisors, or the Board of Directors.
1 See, among others, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) , Blanchard, Giavazza, and Sa (2005) , and Cooper (2008) . Ju and Wei (2007) provide a model on how an inefªcient domestic ªnancial system combined with weak corporate governance and a system of weak property rights can result in a bypass effect of simultaneous FDI inºows and ªnancial capital outºows, a feature shared by many developing countries including China today.
The Scandinavian countries, or the Nordics (i.e., Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) may not be the ªrst case of ªnancial liberalization and ªnancial crisis that spring to the minds of policymakers when they are searching for lessons that are relevant for China at the present time. The Nordics are small, advanced market economies and welfare states, with a history of stable political and legal institutions, and with well-developed commercial banking systems-open societies with some of the highest standards of living in the world today.
Can these countries really hold lessons for China, one of the biggest countries in the world, far less developed, without a modern social security system, lacking a ªrm legal infrastructure, with large state-owned banks, and a dormant ªnancial system-in short, a country in transition from a socialist mode to a market economy?
In answer to that question we are inclined to give a ªrm "yes." The Nordic experience is worth citing for many reasons. First, China today and the Nordic countries before liberalization share a critical mass of common features: a bank-dominated ªnancial system, strong credit controls, exchange (capital account) controls, lack of risk management experience and lack of ªnancial knowledge, but open on the current account side. Moreover, three of the four Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) were pioneers in ªnancial liberalization in the sense that they engineered sharp boom-bust developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of a process of ªnancial liberalization that started in the mid 1980s, well before the emerging market crises of the late 1990s. The forces of ªnancial deregulation and crisis were clearly exposed by the "big-bang" approach adopted by Finland and Sweden in particular. These forces are of a general nature; they apply across countries with diverse characteristics.
The experience of one of the members of the Nordic quartet, Denmark, illustrates how ªnancial liberalization can be implemented without any major output cost, in sharp contrast to events in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The tradition of openness, transparency, and frank public debate in the Nordic countries gives us plenty of data and evidence concerning the process of ªnancial liberalization. In addition, the Nordic countries managed to preserve consensus around the policies adopted to handle the ªnancial crisis, as well as consensus around an open ªnancial system after the ªnancial crisis. As Chinese policymakers are concerned about keeping social tensions at a minimum, the Nordic record may be of special interest on this front.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the present ªnancial system in China, focusing on the ªnancial underdevelopment of China and its implications for global imbalances. Given the state of China's ªnancial sector, Section 3 describes the objectives and risks of ªnancial liberalization in China. Section 4 gives an account of ªnancial liberalization in Scandinavia, ªrst by examining the factors that drove the boom, the bust, and the recovery and, secondly, by considering the long-run post-crisis effects of ªnancial opening. In Section 5, the case for lesson drawing is made, looking in more detail at the differences and similarities between the Nordics and China. In Section 6, lessons from Scandinavia for China are presented. Section 7 concludes. Table 1 provides a condensed summary of the key characteristics of the Chinese ªnancial system, such as its market structure and legal and institutional framework. The system remains dominated by a large banking system mostly consisting of state-owned institutions. Before the GFC, bank loans accounted for more than threequarters of all sources of non-government ªnance, a share that gradually declined to about two-thirds over 2009-11. This decline accelerated in 2012 in part reºecting a shift towards the use of more market-based instruments and regulatory arbitrage, with about half the ªnancial intermediation now taking place outside traditional banking channels. With a domestic credit-to-GDP ratio exceeding 140 percent at the end of 2012, China's banking system is one of the largest in the world, following decades of relatively steady and rapid growth ( Figure 1 ).
China's financial system: An overview

The domestic dimension
The four large state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs)-the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China-have dominated China's banking system. It is worth recalling that the four large SOCBs were created with the break-up of the monobank system in 1984. Two decades later they still accounted for roughly two-thirds of all banking system assets, and employed over 1.5 million staff in around 100,000 branches. By the end of 2012 their share in total banking system assets had declined to about 40 percent, but still dwarfed that of any other banking group, including joint-stock commercial banks or urban commercial banks and credit cooperatives.
Other institutions have a more diverse ownership structure, although government entities in one form or another still play an important role. These include the jointstock commercial banks, which tend to be part owned by sub-national governments as well as by foreign and private domestic investors, rural credit cooperatives, and policy banks with a speciªc development objective. Wholly owned foreign-funded banks have more recently begun to enter the market with China's opening under the WTO rules, albeit starting from a small base (see the following). A. Key characteristics of the ªnancial system
• Banking system Dominated by a few large commercial banks, and many small savings banks. The roots of the banking system stem from the 19th century.
Dominated by four SOCBs established with the break-up of the monobank system in 1984; commercial bank law since 1995; establishment of ªrst non-state commercial bank in 1996
• Non-bank system Stock market, bond market, and insurance sector kept at bay by ªnancial regulations, no major non-bank ªnancial intermediaries (except ªnance companies). Foreign bank activities severely restricted or prohibited.
Emerging stock market, created in 1990 with limited free ºoat and dominated by SOEs; nascent bond market, hampered by regulatory, legal and structural weaknesses.
• Supervision Supervision based on formal control of bank lending and adherence to other regulation, without explicit risk supervision.
Progress in establishing a framework for prudential supervision, including the establishment of bank and securities regulators, CBRC (2003) and CSRC (1990) ; gradual phase-in of a bank solvency framework towards BIS standards as well as international best practice in accounting and classiªcation standards.
• Competition Competition restricted by the regulation of interest rates, fees and credit ºows on each individual bank and entry into the ªnancial sector. Restrictions on the establishment of new branches. Foreign banks not allowed to establish subsidiaries or branches in Sweden.
No competition legislation and institutions; competition from foreign banks gradually phased-in under WTO commitments; competition from smaller joint-stock banks hampered by thin/inefªcient interbank market (in part reºecting the PBC's frequent use of reserve requirements).
B. Incentives for risk management
• Legal system Strong legal system concerning bankruptcy procedures ("rule of law").
Weak enforcement of bankruptcy law (ªrst adopted in 1998) and other creditor rights implies preference for borrowers with implicit or explicit state guarantees, such as SOEs.
• Governance Strong central bank control of the ºow of credit. Mostly private ownership of commercial and savings banks.
Role of the state as owner, supervisor, and customer of banks can create signiªcant conºicts of interest, marring management accountability, performance-based salaries and promotions, and commercial decision making; foreign strategic investors beginning to play a role in governance and risk management.
• Capital Capital raised through the private sectors. Repeated state-funded recapitalization of SOCBs (1998 SOCBs ( , 1999 SOCBs ( , 2000 SOCBs ( , 2003 SOCBs ( , 2004 SOCBs ( , 2005 to compensate for legacy NPLs.
• Financial system controls
• Interest rate controls
Interest rate controls, explicit or implicit, by the central bank.
Some liberalization of interest rates, but ºoor on lending and cap on deposit rates.
• Rationing of credit Rationing of credits through the central bank and other public authorities.
Directed lending gradually phased-out around 1998, but continued signiªcant lending from SCBs to SOEs; lending quotas ("window guidance") remain key monetary policy tool (see below); together with targets for NPL reduction this can provide incentive to rollover hidden NPLs to SOEs.
• Exchange rate regime
Pegged exchange rates to currency baskets. Pegged to U.S. dollar until July 21, 2005; currently classiªed as a crawl-like arrangement (de facto) or a managed ºoating arrangement (de jure).
• Capital account controls
Capital controls in effect since World War II after some liberalization in the 1970s.
Gradual relaxation with most transactions still subject to controls shielding the domestic banking system from international competition; total qualiªed foreign institutional investors.
Given this structure, reforming the SOCBs has been at the core of China's transition towards a market-based ªnancial system. The SOCBs have for a long time continued to focus primarily on allocating credit to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) based on government plans rather than on commercial criteria, which has in part been reinforced by the absence or weakness of creditor rights, conferring an advantage on borrowers with implicit or explicit state guarantees. 3 The ªrst non-state commercial bank was established as recently as in 1996.
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• Status of central bank
The central bank under the (unofªcial) control of the government via the ministry of ªnance.
The PBC must report to the State Council its decisions concerning the money supply, interest rates, exchange rates and other important issues speciªed by the State Council for approval. The PBC is also obliged to submit reports to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the conduct of monetary policy and the performance of the ªnancial system.
• Key policy instruments • Recent performance and vulnerabilities
• Inºation track record
High inºation in the late 1970s and early 1980s as part of an accommodative policy of devaluation to maintain full employment.
Periods of double-digit inºation in part reºecting price liberalization; state procurement and non-market prices are now largely phased out, with average annual CPI inºation over past ªve years about 3.3 percent.
• Fiscal position Large budget deªcits accepted after OPEC I and II to maintain high domestic aggregate demand (to ªght unemployment) in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Strong real GDP growth has resulted in betterthan-budgeted revenue per-formance and smaller deªcits with an ofªcial government debt level of 23 percent of GDP; contingent liabilities from a weak banking system; sovereign credit rating is AA-(S&P), Aa3 (Moody's) and Aϩ (Fitch).
• External position Improved current account position after OPEC I and II and repeated devaluations.
Strong; current account surplus averaging 4.7 percent of GDP over last ªve years, gross ofªcial reserves exceeding US$ 3 trillion (22 months of imports) at end 2012.
As a result the system has produced a large burden of non-performing loans (NPLs), which has led to several attempts at recapitalization and bank reform. 4 The most recent major initiative to enhance banking system efªciency started in late 2003 when the government announced the recapitalization of two major SOCBs in return for changes in the legal structure, corporate governance, and risk management, paving the way for strategic foreign investors and eventual listing on the Hong Kong SAR stock exchange.
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In parallel with bank restructuring, efforts have been made to improve the legal and supervisory framework. In April 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission was established to allow an approach more focused on supervision objectives and ongoing banking system reform, and the People's Bank of China-hitherto the supervisor-was to further develop monetary policy, including by placing increased reliance on market-oriented instruments. 6 In addition, the authorities gradually introduced a bank solvency framework based on BIS standards, as well as an international best practice in accounting and classiªcation standards. A gradual widening or removal of ºoors and ceilings for interest rates since 1996 has fostered greater commercial orientation among banks.
Beyond the banking system, the launch of a short-term bond market and a nontradable share reform in 2005 were key developments in promoting more balanced growth of the ªnancial system. These followed the creation of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 1990. Yet, notwithstanding the steady growth of the stock market, China's broader ªnancial system remains under development, with important institutional structures only being recently formed. These structures, such as rating agencies, accounting and audit bodies, and experience with the associated information and legal systems that are necessary to ensure a high degree of transparency and disclosure standards, are still in their infancy in China. 
The external dimension
The large size and steady growth of China's banking system in part reºects a combination of high household savings rates, which in itself is likely to be the result of an underdeveloped and unbalanced ªnancial system, and capital account restrictions that limit cross-border ºows of capital, and reduce foreign competition and overseas investment opportunities. Although bank deposits remain the main savings vehicle within China, access to foreign instruments is limited through the Qualiªed Domestic Institutional Investor scheme (QDII). Despite its recent expansion to include equities, the QDII scheme continues to play a fairly limited role. Until June 2012, there was only around 30 percent of the approved QDII quota of US$ 77 billion invested-equivalent to about 0.5 percent of savings deposits. 8 In addition, a tightly managed exchange rate has hampered the development of instruments and a market for managing and hedging currency risks. There is a consensus that structural reforms, including bank reform and ªnancial liberalization, can play an important role in affecting savings and investment behavior and thereby help achieve an orderly resolution of global imbalances. 13 In addition, Chinese banks have been recapitalized with ofªcial reserves in past restructuring exercises, suggesting that reserves may also act as a buffer to cope with reform failures in the future. As such, China's ofªcial reserves highlight the massive footprint that the lack of ªnancial liberalization and other structural reforms may leave on the global economy. Dunaway and Li (2005) and Dunaway, Leigh, and Li (2009) . For the debate on the Chinese policy of reserve accumulation, see, among others, Bussière and Mehl (2008) , Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) , Haltmaier et al. (2007) , and McKinnon and Schnabl (2008) .
13 Accelerating ªnancial sector reform has been a key policy commitment by China under the IMF multilateral consultation on global imbalances. For an analysis of the role of banking sector reform and ªnancial market development on household consumption and ªrm investment in China see, for example, Aziz (2006) , Aziz and Cui (2007) , and, in particular on the interplay with enterprise reform, Dollar and Wei (2007) . See also Farrell et al. (2006) . To summarize, China's ªnancial system has undergone signiªcant reform since the break-up of the monobank system less than three decades ago. The culture of independent and commercial decision making is young at best, especially when compared with the century-old tradition of commercial banking in Scandinavia and other advanced market economies.
At the same time, progress in overcoming a legacy of state ownership and credit allocation to SOEs, and in building the legal, supervisory, and macroeconomic framework necessary for setting the appropriate risk management incentives, has been gradual. In this context, Ng (2007) characterized China's transition to a marketoriented banking sector and, by implication, to a market-based ªnancial system by using the famous aphorism of Deng Xiaoping "crossing the river by touching the stones."
Nevertheless, this gradual approach, combined with stable macroeconomic growth and capital controls shielding the system from foreign competition and cross-border capital ºows, has contributed to conªdence in the banking system. The steady rise of bank intermediation in China to some of the highest levels worldwide stands in marked contrast to the experience in the transition economies of Eastern and Central Europe, where periods of sharp retrenchment and disintermediation (in other words, ªnancial tensions and banking crises) have been a common aspect of ªnancial reform experience. 
Financial liberalization in China
Objectives
Financial liberalization in China has to be put in the context of overall reform towards a market-based economy. This implies, as shown by the experience of many transition economies, that reforms in the ªnancial sector must be tackled in concert with reforms in other areas, notably in the corporate sector (including SOEs), in the legal and institutional framework, and at the macroeconomic level (including monetary and exchange rate policies). Given their dominance in the ªnancial system, reforms of the large SOCBs have been put at the core of China's strategy to improve the intermediation of its large private sector savings. Mutually reinforcing reforms at the macroeconomic level, such as reforms towards a more independent, market-based monetary and exchange rate policy and capital account liberalization, are also on the agenda.
Unlike most other transition economies, China's experience so far has been unique in that domestic macroeconomic stability and growth have been maintained throughout the reform process. China's economic weight in the world makes it "too big to fail"; while a large and growing current account surplus (or savings-investment imbalance) continues to put additional pressures on its major trading partners.
Maintaining stability, and at the same time improving allocative efªciency through the liberalization process, are thus the overarching reform objectives, both from a Chinese and from a global perspective. Moreover, ªnancial liberalization can also play an important role in rebalancing China's growth and reducing global imbalances. As banks in China increasingly operate on a commercial basis, and as the capital market develops further, the efªciency of investments is likely to improve, and better access for households to both credit and savings instruments would boost consumption and bring down the high savings rate.
Risks
The Chinese authorities have sought stability in the reform process primarily by adopting a gradual approach. Although this has been reasonably successful so far, gradualism is not without risks. Along with the gradual reforms, there has been a build-up in domestic and external imbalances that result from the still artiªcially low cost of capital-favored by a lack of competition for funds among the dominant SOCBs-of energy and land, and from policies that favor the export sector. At the same time, a rigid exchange-rate regime has hampered the effectiveness of monetary policy in curbing investment and credit growth. On the external front, pressures have been mounting too, as China's growing current account surplus in the run-up to the GFC became so large relative to the rest of the world that it was increasing the risk of a protectionist backlash, thereby threatening global trade and investment. Since its peak in 2007 at over 10 percent of GDP, China's current account surplus has declined to about 2.6 percent of GDP in 2012. To what extent this rebalancing can be sustained, however, remains an open question. Notwithstanding signiªcant policy efforts to boost domestic demand, so far the decline in China's surplus has been largely achieved through higher investment, which could fuel future increases in exports or raise concerns about growing internal imbalances with excess capacity showing up at some point in more bad loans in the banking system, as suggested by Nabar and Unteroberdoerster (2012) .
Moving on to the core of the ªnancial reforms, a concern related to the possible shift from external to internal imbalances is the risk that the gradual approach to the reform of SOCBs is not effective in changing their behavior. So far, the SOCBs have strengthened their balance sheets with the help of public recapitalization funds, but without prior demonstration of improvements in key operational areas, particularly risk management. Non-performing loans have been successfully reduced, but this is merely a backward-looking indicator. In fact, SOCBs have been instrumental in executing the government's credit-fuelled stimulus program in the aftermath of the GFC and recession of 2008-09. What would happen to NPLs if the economy were to slow after years of rapid growth, or if the export sector were to falter? Moreover, Podpiera (2006) demonstrates that lending behavior of SOCBs has changed little at best, and in particular that the pricing of credit risks remains undifferentiated, while lending appears to be mainly driven by the availability of funds (i.e., savings deposits) and does not take enterprise performance into account.
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Given the need for a comprehensive approach to reform, there is also the risk of inconsistencies between reform areas. For example, without further reform of SOEs and the corporate sector at large, more accountable risk managers at banks may actually shift lending away from the private sector, given the lack of guarantees and reliable accounting data.
Greater autonomy of banks in pricing credit risks will require additional interest rate liberalization. Incentives for developing exchange risk tools will depend on the degree of exchange rate liberalization. In turn, the awareness of exchange rate risks and experience in managing them will inºuence the costs and beneªts from further capital account liberalization. In this context, Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang (2005) argue that the liberalization of capital ºows should be sequenced in a manner that reinforces domestic ªnancial liberalization and allows for learning to manage additional risks, making greater exchange rate ºexibility a pre-requisite for fully opening the capital account.
Towards a new balance?
Further ªnancial reform and liberalization strike us as inevitable, as China's transition to a market-based economy is far from completed. Yet, given the complexity of the challenge arising from the intricate interdependencies with progress in other reform areas and the need for maintaining stability, the ongoing reforms have to strike an appropriate balance between being gradual and being substantive. This will afford policymakers time to learn and a margin of (inevitable) error, as any reformeven in advanced economies-is fraught with unintended consequences, which is, as we shall see, a key lesson from the Scandinavian liberalization experience. It will also enable the reforms in different areas to become mutually reinforcing and to sustain the momentum of reform.
Financial liberalization, crisis, and recovery in Scandinavia 16
The financial system and economic policies prior to financial liberalization
The policy framework and the macroeconomic policies that evolved in Finland, Norway, and Sweden after World War II crucially inºuenced developments during and after ªnancial liberalization. The ªnancial system of Finland, Norway, and Sweden in 1985, roughly at the start of the process of ªnancial liberalization, is presented in stylized form in Table 1 . The ªnancial system was bank-based, with banks (both commercial and savings banks) having the major role as ªnancial intermediaries. The government held a strong position in the governance of the ªnancial system, determining via the central bank the allocation of credit and the level of interest rates.
Finland, Norway, and Sweden became early members of the Bretton Woods system, pegging their exchange rates to the U.S. dollar. All three countries maintained farreaching capital account or exchange controls. The control of the external ºow of capital was a major pillar for post-war stabilization policies, because it isolated Finland, Norway, and Sweden from international ªnancial developments, thus allowing far-reaching domestic interventionist and selective monetary and ªscal policies. The capital account controls served as the wall behind which the central banks determined the rate of interest as well as the distribution and size of capital ºows within the domestic economies according to political priorities.
Monetary policy was used to subsidize those sectors of the economy that the government wanted to support with low interest rates and an ample supply of credit.
Banking became an almost risk-free enterprise in this system. Because nominal interest rates were kept below market-clearing levels by means of regulations, the demand for credit remained greater than the available supply, which was rationed by the monetary authorities. As a result, households and ªrms in the private sector remained permanently credit-constrained, with the exception of those sectors that obtained ªnance through the allocation of credit by the central bank.
International ªnancial integration contributed to the downfall of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. Nevertheless, after its demise, both capital account controls and internal ªnancial controls remained in force in Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and their exchange rates remained pegged.
In the 1970s, full employment emerged as a major policy goal. One reason was the strong political position of labor parties and labor unions; another reason was the dominance of Keynesian policy thinking. The goal of full employment in the face of the two oil crises (OPEC I and II) contributed to expansionary ªscal and monetary policies in the form of several devaluations of the pegged exchange rates to maintain aggregate demand. The devaluations created the adjustment of real wages that was required in order to maintain full employment during the 1970s and early 1980s. Sweden took a leading role. When Sweden devalued, its Nordic neighbors commonly felt forced to follow suit to stay competitive.
Denmark, however, did not follow Sweden's huge devaluation in October 1982. Instead, it kept its exchange rate unchanged as part of a hard currency policy that has remained in force since that time. In fact, the Danish decision not to follow the Swedish devaluation was a crucial one, as it set Denmark off on a trajectory that was different from that of Finland, Norway, and Sweden later in the 1990s. 17 Norway did not devalue at this time either.
As a result of the policy of accommodation, high inºation and high inºationary expectations became deeply rooted in the 1970s and early 1980s. Real after-tax interest rates turned negative due to the combination of regulation of nominal interest rates, high inºation, and a tax system that allowed substantial tax deductions for private individuals for the payment of interest on housing loans.
To sum up, prior to the ªnancial crisis of the 1990s, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were seen as small, rich, welfare states, immune to the high unemployment that plagued large parts of Western Europe. To many, they appeared to be successful models for economic policy based on consensus within society. Few understood that the macroeconomic policy regimes of the three countries rested on a system of farreaching capital account regulations that isolated them from the rest of the world.
Financial liberalization and boom-bust in Finland, Norway, and Sweden
Financial liberalization and the boom. In the early 1980s, the ªnancial systems of Finland, Norway, and Sweden underwent major deregulation, starting with
Norway. The abolition of domestic and external controls was a gradual process, which took place over several years. It is difªcult to identify one single comprehensive measure or indicator of the liberalization process. The three Nordic countries opened their capital accounts fully at the end of the 1980s following domestic liberalization.
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Financial liberalization had a fundamental effect on the incentives of lenders and borrowers. Bank lending could now be expanded free of any binding regulatory restrictions. Banks entered into ªerce competition for market shares. They did so primarily by expanding loans to old and new customers rather than by reducing spreads between lending rates and deposit rates. On a risk-adjusted basis, however, the aggressive growth into new market segments may well have entailed a substantial narrowing of the banks' interest rate margins. The lending boom that started in the mid 1980s channeled credit to the asset markets, causing rising asset prices. Asset prices grew more rapidly than consumer prices. Rising asset prices in turn formed the basis for rising collateral values, further fuelling credit expansion as part of a cumulative process.
The private sector, previously strongly rationed in the credit market, made use of the growth in asset prices as collateral for absorbing more debt. As banks and other ªnancial institutions increased their lending, in particular for property purchases, the volume of bank loans as a percentage of GDP rose markedly in the Nordic countries ( Figure 3 ).
In this process, the rate of inºation and inºation expectations increased further. Real after-tax interest rates (adjusted for inºation expectations) were negative or close to zero for companies and households, which bolstered their demand for loans (Figure 4) . The ªnancial system experienced a period of extreme expansion. The result of the new incentive structure was a build-up, as became apparent later, of massive over-indebtedness and corresponding over-lending within the ªnancial system in the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish economies.
The macroeconomic outcome was a strong boom, ªrst in Norway, and later in Finland and Sweden in 1988-89, as Norway had started its ªnancial deregulation a few years before Finland and Sweden. The boom was characterized by overfull employment, rising consumption, and falling savings. The current account worsened as export performance weakened, sharply in Norway (primarily as a result of falling oil prices around 1986) and more slowly in Finland and Sweden. Government budgets turned into surplus during the peak on the back of rising revenues from property-and capital-based taxes, as well as revenues related to booming consumption and high nominal wage growth. Public consumption and public expenditures also grew rapidly during the boom. Strong international expansion in the second half of the 1980s compounded the overheating of the Nordic economies, in particular in Finland and Sweden.
At this point in time, judging from policy documents, from interviews after the crisis with policymakers, and from the memoirs of ministers of ªnance and central bankers, the policymakers did not recognize the risks inherent in the process of ªnancial integration. Initially they were unwilling to change either monetary or ªscal policy. Monetary policy was conªned to safeguarding the pegged exchange rate, with the exception of the devaluation of the Norwegian currency in 1986 following the decline in the price of oil (OPEC III). Finland made a failed attempt to dampen its boom in 1989 by revaluing the markka.
All in all, ªnancial deregulation was the key to the birth of the strong boom phase in all three countries. The deregulation was pushed through without any serious public debate. It was not presented as part of a larger policy program, but rather as a series of technical changes. There was no common knowledge of the consequences of international ªnancial integration, although a few voices did warn of the dangers. Rising real interest rates and bust. The boom in the real economy was eventually halted and transformed into a bust by a combination of factors. Real interest rates rose internationally as a result of German monetary policy becoming more contractionary after German reuniªcation, putting strong upward pressure on Nordic interest rates. In addition, monetary policy was made more restrictive by the pegging of the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish currencies to the ecu in 1990-91. Previously, the exchange rates had been linked to a basket of currencies. Finnish and Swedish domestic interest rates rose strongly above those of Germany when attempts were made to defend the pegged exchange rate against recurring speculative attacks in 1989-92. 20 As the Finnish and Swedish currencies became overvalued because of the boom, the export sector encountered growing problems. For Finland, the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union contributed to domestic imbalances.
Various policy measures increased the real after-tax interest rate. In Finland, stepwise limitations in the tax deductibility of mortgage rates in the early 1990s raised the after-tax cost of servicing debt. The far-reaching Swedish tax reform of 1990-91, which lowered marginal taxes signiªcantly, contributed to higher real after-tax interest rates by reducing the tax deductibility of mortgage rates. In this way, borrowing became less attractive, and private savings grew more attractive. A rapid and not altogether expected decline in the rate of consumer price inºation in 1990-92 also contributed to the sharp rise in real interest rates in Finland and Sweden (Figure 4 ).
The signiªcant increase in the real rate of interest had profound effects on the balance sheets of the private sector. Asset price deºation surfaced when the value of real assets was reduced by the rise in real interest rates. Balance sheets turned fragile when asset values (primarily property prices) fell below collateral values. At the same time, the nominal values of debts remained unchanged. The losses of wealth became enormous, forcing an adjustment of portfolios that led to lower private consumption and investments and to a strong increase in private savings.
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The harder households and companies tried to improve their wealth position by selling assets, the deeper the crisis became. The number of bankruptcies increased dramatically. Asset price deºation showed a cumulative tendency. The selling off of property forced down property prices which, in turn, triggered new sales. Stock market prices tumbled, in particular those of ªrms engaged in the ªnancial sector, real estate and construction. The crisis turned into a systemic ªnancial crisis-a new experience for the Nordic countries in the post-World War II period.
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Investments plummeted, most rapidly within the construction sector. Real GDP growth fell sharply. The Finnish and Swedish economies contracted in the early 1990s. Unemployment soared. Tax revenues fell and public expenditure rose. In Finland and Sweden, the government budget deªcit-and thus the ratio of government debt to GDP-increased dramatically, particularly in Finland. Norway, on the other hand, did not experience any rise in government debt thanks to large government revenues from oil and gas extraction.
In 1992, the ªnancial system of all the three countries was rocked when their currencies were exposed to major speculative attacks. An international currency crisis erupted in September 1992. The domestic banking crisis quickly turned into a currency crisis as well. The Finnish markka was ºoated in September 1992. The Swedish krona followed suit two months later, in November 1992. The Norwegian krone was taken off its pegged rate in December 1992.
Recovery. The ºoating of the currencies in the autumn of 1992, with ensuing depreciation and receding domestic interest rates, arrested the downturn of the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish economies. An upturn commenced in all three countries in the following year and lasted for several years, although unemployment remained high for a long time. Unemployment did not start to decline until the mid 1990s, from which point it fell steadily. The main engine behind the recovery was an impressive growth in exports. Export shares rose signiªcantly in all three countries, most markedly in Finland and Sweden.
The rate of inºation stayed contained, at around 2 percent per annum throughout the period 1995-2000. Wage and price increases remained at surprisingly low levels given the size of the depreciation of the currencies. High unemployment contributed to low wage increases. Fiscal policy was directed towards lowering the budget deªcits. The three countries eventually emerged among the strongest in Europe in terms of their budgetary position, although the Norwegian case is a special one due to the revenues from the energy sector. The recovery after the boom-bust cycle turned out to be a lengthy one; it lasted at least until the downturn in worldwide economic activity initiated by the GFC that started in 2008.
The exception-The case of Denmark
Denmark avoided the economy-wide systemic ªnancial crisis that hit Finland, Norway, and Sweden in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A combination of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors contributed to Denmark being spared the Nordic boom-bust pattern, although substantial problems emerged in both the Danish banking sector and the Danish economy.
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In the early 1980s, Denmark was facing severe economic problems. Unemployment, inºation, and interest rates were high; large budget deªcits prevailed and deªcits on the current account were large. In addition, policymakers faced a credibility problem as the Danish krone had been devalued several times. In the midst of these problems, on 9 September 1982, Denmark announced the adoption of a hard currency policy by tying the krone to the ecu, a basket of European currencies. A month later, when Sweden devalued by 16 percent on 8 October, Denmark decided not to follow suit, instead remaining in the European Monetary System of pegged exchange rates where the German mark acted as the anchor of the system. Thus Danish monetary policy was tied to Germany's policy.
The credibility of the Danish currency peg gradually increased. Fiscal policy was tightened in the face of chronic and rising current account deªcits. By 1990, this policy gradually wiped out the deªcit, turning it into a surplus of 3 percent of GDP in 1993, whereas Finland and Sweden displayed huge deªcits in 1990-93. Following gradual reforms of the labor market and cautious demand management in the second half of the 1990s, unemployment fell to a level below that of most other European countries.
As a result, the European currency crises in 1992-93 and the short-term deviation by Denmark from the pegged exchange rate regime during this episode did not affect the stability of either the Danish economy or its banking sector. In the long-term perspective, the external orientation of ªscal policy and the strict adherence to a pegged exchange rate for the krone were crucial in bringing about macroeconomic stability in Denmark after the precarious situation in the early 1980s. In contrast to its Nordic neighbors, Denmark managed to create a macroeconomic policy that did not foster a boom-bust cycle, thereby contributing to stable ªnancial and monetary conditions.
Turning to the ªnancial sector, Denmark adopted a more market-oriented approach to the governance of ªnancial markets in the post-World War II period than its Nordic neighbors. Denmark also entered a process of ªnancial liberalization in the 1980s. However, it started from a position where-as early as the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s-Danish ªnancial markets were already more integrated with the international ªnancial markets than was the case in the other Nordic countries. Quantitative and other restrictions on the banking sector (internal liberalization) had already been terminated in 1980-81, prior to domestic deregulation in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Moreover, deregulation was introduced in the midst of a recession. All in all, ªnancial liberalization in Denmark involved less of a change in prevailing conditions than was the case in the other Nordic countries.
The ªnancial position of commercial banks in Denmark deteriorated in the late 1980s. The problems came to a head in 1991-93, when the total losses and loss provisions reached more than 5 percent of GDP. The losses and loss provisions relative to GDP of Danish banks were at the same level as in Norway, although lower than in Finland and Sweden. The problems of Danish banks never developed into a systemic banking crisis, however. 24 Government support for commercial banks in Denmark stayed at 0.4 percent of GDP, whereas it was 8.1 percent for Finland, 3.6 percent for Norway, and 4.1 percent for Sweden. In addition, the Danish banking system was able to absorb the losses and the loss provisions by itself because Danish banks were better capitalized than the banks of the other Nordic countries.
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To sum up, a combination of macroeconomic and structural policies inoculated the Danish economy against the forces that created the boom-bust patterns in Finland, Norway, and Sweden in the late 1980s. Denmark adopted a hard currency policy in the early 1980s and managed to maintain this approach despite a number of challenges, including problems within its banking system. That system was well capitalized and more geared towards ªnancial openness than was the case in the other Nordic countries.
The long-run effects of financial integration
The Nordic ªnancial crisis of the 1990s was a devastating one, as demonstrated in Table 2 , which shows the real costs of the major crises that have hit the Nordic economies since the 1870s, using an approach developed by the IMF (1998) and extended by Bordo et al. (2001) . The loss in real income growth, as deªned by the IMF approach, is calculated by taking the sum of the differences between the trend growth rate and the actual growth rate from the start of the crisis until the growth rate returns to trend rate. This is also done for industrial production. Table 2 shows that the ªnancial crisis of the 1990s, measured as the output loss in percent of GDP, was deepest in Finland (26.4 percent), followed by Sweden (13.0 percent) and Norway (12.4 percent); Denmark did not experience any crisis in the 1990s.
The same picture emerges when the cost of the crises is estimated in terms of loss of industrial production, although there are two main differences. The crises in Finland and Sweden are close in terms of size (21.4 and 17.0 percent, respectively), while the cost of the crisis in Norway is small (2.7 percent). As mentioned earlier, there is no evidence of any crisis in Denmark in the 1990s. Looking beyond the immediate crisis and its costs to society, it is clear that ªnancial liberalization has profoundly changed the economic landscape in the Nordic countries. These long-run effects have been overshadowed by the dramatic events during the boom-bust cycle. Once ªnancial markets were opened up, however, this impacted on a large number of sectors both inside and outside the ªnancial system.
The rules for monetary and ªscal policymaking were reformed. Inºation targets were introduced. Finland entered the euro area in 1999 as part of the process of European monetary and ªnancial integration. The stock markets of Finland and Sweden expanded as part of the process of ªnancial opening and integration. Foreign holdings of domestic stocks showed a rapid rise. Corporate governance changed profoundly once foreign ownership was allowed. Taxation was adjusted to international tax competition. These effects are discussed in the following.
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Effects on the design of stabilization policies. Financial liberalization had a major impact on the stabilization policy regime in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. First, the pegged exchange-rate regime of the three countries was abolished, as the pegged rate proved to be an inadequate nominal anchor during the process of ªnancial liberalization and the ensuing boom-bust. After the crisis, the pegged rate was replaced by inºation targeting. This monetary policy strategy, founded on openness, accountability, and communication through changes in the short-term interest rate set by the central bank, requires the existence of well-functioning ªnancial markets.
Thus ªnancial liberalization and subsequent ªnancial integration created the prerequisites for a new type of monetary policy regime or policy framework that could not have existed in the previous economy, which had been ªnancially closed and heavily regulated, and where short-and long-term interest rates were subject to strict administrative controls.
Second, following the experience of large budget deªcits, the institutional framework for ªscal policy making was changed, particularly in Sweden, towards a rulebased policy. The basic idea was to reduce the scope for short-term discretionary ªscal policies by tying the hands of policymakers. This policy has so far been successful in the sense that the Nordic countries can point to some of the strongest public ªnances in Europe.
Effects on growth.
Although improving economic efªciency is the central objective, there is still considerable debate about the growth effects of ªnancial liberalization, given that it is often associated with boom-bust patterns, ending in ªnancial crises and deep recessions with negative growth rates. 28 The evidence from Scandinavia, which is not commonly referred to in the international debate, throws light on the relationship between ªnancial integration and growth. In short, the Nordic record suggests that ªnancial crises, triggered by a process of ªnancial liberalization, can be extremely costly in the short run in many respects: to society, to taxpayers, to owners of stocks and equities, and to politicians in power. Such crises can also contribute to high growth for a long period following the recovery, however ( Table 2 ).
The ªscal cost of the crisis was enormous, as budget deªcits and public debt soared when tax revenues declined and government expenditures increased, largely due to the workings of automatic stabilizers. Government support for the ªnancial system ballooned in the short run. The private sector-in particular holders of stocks in banks and other ªnancial institutions-was hit by huge wealth losses. The political costs were signiªcant, too. Governments in power at the start of the crisis lost popularity and were replaced in subsequent elections. Whether or not the policymakers in power were the ones who had designed the policies that led to the crisis, the voters held them responsible.
Looking at the long-run consequences of the ªnancial crisis on the growth of the economy during the early 1990s, a more positive picture emerges. The post-crisis 24 Asian Economic Papers
Lessons for China from Financial Liberalization in Scandinavia growth rates of Finland and Sweden have been high compared to the EU average since 1993 and also compared to the pre-crisis growth pattern of the 1970s and 1980s. There is much to suggest that this improved growth performance is associated with the ªnancial crisis and the subsequent ªnancial integration.
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The ªnancial crisis served as a window of opportunity for policymakers to carry out growth-enhancing reforms. In this way, the crisis contributed to the transformation of the Nordic economies, making them more dynamic, releasing Schumpeterian processes and raising their growth potential. It is likely that the rapid developments in the ªnancial systems of Finland and Sweden impacted positively on the growth potential of the two economies.
Effects on structural policies. Most of the discussion of the immediate impact of ªnancial liberalization and ªnancial integration has focused on the banking system and the ªnancial sector. Once the cross-border barriers to ªnancial ºows had been eliminated in Finland and Sweden, however, competitive pressure for efªciency-enhancing reform spilled over into areas other than the ªnancial system.
This affected policy areas such as the rules and regulations dealing with foreign ownership of domestic real and ªnancial assets, the taxation of income and wealth in a ªnancially open economy, and the design of corporate governance laws. 30 In Sweden, gift taxes, inheritance taxes, and wealth taxes were abolished in the early 2000s in response to the opening of the Swedish ªnancial sector. These are radical changes for a country with a strong egalitarian tradition. Financial integration is thus likely to impact on the distribution of income and wealth. Recent empirical research suggests that periods of ªnancial integration and freely working ªnancial systems in Sweden are associated with growing differences in income and wealth.
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To sum up, ªnancial integration following the policy of ªnancial liberalization lent a powerful impetus to the process of globalization of the Nordic economies, affecting the characteristics of the Nordic or Scandinavian model. 32 There is much to suggest that this pattern is to a large extent due to the long-run adjustment dynamics created by the ªnancial crisis and by subsequent ªnancial integration. 31 Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2008) . 32 The Scandinavian or Nordic model is recently evaluated in Andersen et al. (2007) and Calmfors (2007) .
The case for learning lessons
In our introduction we asked the question: Can the Nordic experience of ªnancial liberalization really hold lessons for China, given the differences between China and the Nordics? We believe that these differences do not preclude the drawing of lessons per se. Rather, they indicate the extent to which policy lessons should be qualiªed to reºect country-speciªc circumstances. Still, we will argue subsequently that it is the similarities that dominate, as China and the Nordic countries share a critical mass of common features. Moreover, the Nordic reform experience holds lessons of a general nature on the dynamics of boom and bust and how to preserve a consensus for reform that are worthwhile for China to consider as it proceeds with ªnancial liberalization.
Differences between the Nordics and China
Size is arguably the main fundamental difference between the Nordics and China. (See Table 3 for some key demographic and economic comparisons between the Nordics and China). By the end of 2012, about 20 percent of the world's population lived in China, more than 50 times the total population of the Nordics as a whole. China's GDP was about 11 percent of the world total, or about ªve times that of the Nordic countries. China's size means that monitoring and maintaining an orderly and steady reform process is more challenging than in the case of the Nordics. This is further complicated by China's signiªcantly less advanced stage of development and much higher income inequality. The Nordics' per capita income is about 20 times higher than that of China in purchasing power parity terms. In addition, income inequality, in particular between coastal areas and inland provinces, has been rising rapidly in China. 33 As a result, the risk that the social costs of reform may create social tensions is signiªcantly higher in China than it was in the case of the Nordics. Indeed, a highly risk-averse approach and the fear of economic and social instability on the side of the Chinese authorities are part of the explanation why China's process of ªnancial liberalization has been more gradual than in Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
Risks associated with differences in size and stages of development are mitigated by China's more favorable macroeconomic performance in a number of areas. First of all, China's economic growth in the past decade has been high and stable at an average annual rate of around 10 percent, much higher than among the Nordics where growth rates ranged between 0 and 4 percent in the early 1980s before ªnancial liberalization. Second, high economic growth in China in recent years has resulted in stronger government revenues and smaller ªscal deªcits than among the Nordics. The ofªcial government debt ªgure is only 23 percent of GDP in China in 2012, although contingent liabilities might be large. In the Nordic countries, the budget deªcits were large in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to stimulus spending to combat the effects of the two oil crises, OPEC I and II in the 1970s. Third, as mentioned before, China has the largest foreign reserves in the world, over US$ 3 trillion, more than 160 percent of total imports or over nine times its short-term debt, whereas the Nordic countries as a whole held less than US$ 30 billion of foreign reserves in 1985 (i.e., 38 percent of total imports; Figure 2 ). Fourth, China's currency experienced no sustained depreciation pressure over the past decade, whereas the currencies in the Nordic countries generally depreciated in the early 1980s.
Finally, regarding the ªnancial system, the volume of credit supplied by China's banking system as a percentage of GDP is more than 140 percent in 2012, much higher than the ratio for the Nordic countries in the early 1980s, which was less than 50 percent of GDP (Figure 1 ). Stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP is also relatively high, even after making allowance for the boom in China in 2008, compared with the Nordic countries in the early 1980s ( Figure 5 ). Given its stage of development, China's ªnancial system thus enjoys a relatively high level of intermediation and conªdence. Taken together, these strong macroeconomic fundamentals, compared with the case of the Nordics, provide positive initial conditions for China's process of ªnancial liberalization.
In addition, China's relative lack of ªnancial openness, revealed in Figures 7 and 8 , can, at least initially, help provide a controlled environment for reform by minimizing the adverse impact of potentially volatile capital ºows. The ratio of foreign assets of the banking system to GDP in Scandinavia is much higher than in China ( Figure 6 ). Currently, Scandinavia is forging far ahead of China on this account. The same holds for the ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP (Figure 7) . A similar picture emerges from inward FDIs and outward FDIs, where Scandinavia is more open, in particular as regards outward ºows.
Nevertheless, there remain major structural disadvantages relative to the Nordics. The Chinese economy is presently in transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one. Although the process has been ongoing for 35 years, there is a large state-owned sector that may still be subject to soft budget constraints to varying degrees. This was not the case for the Nordics, as they are market economies. The banking system, the capital market and corporate governance are still at a relatively early stage of development in China, as highlighted in tem with regard to bankruptcy procedures, enforcement structure, and the rights of creditors and debtors is far less developed than in the Nordic countries with their long legal tradition.
Similarities between the Nordic countries and China
Notwithstanding these differences, there are important similarities that provide a sound basis for drawing lessons. First of all, China's ªnancial system is dominated by four large SOCBs, and its ªnancial reform and liberalization is part of the overall reform from centrally planned economy to market-based economy, which is also in line with China's WTO commitment. This is similar to the situation in the Nordic countries in the early 1980s, where banks dominated the ªnancial system and ªnancial reforms were part of a movement towards economic liberalization, catching up with the rest of Western Europe, as well as a way of moving towards closer European integration.
Secondly, China still has a large state-owned sector, which faces much less strict conditions when seeking loans from banks. Interest rates on deposits and loans are still controlled by the central bank, with a ºoor for lending rates and a ceiling for deposit rates. The lending-deposit rate gap is relatively large; commercial banks are under the protection of the central bank and interest income still dominates their revenue sources. Banking supervision is mostly administrative, although it has made some progress towards risk-based supervision. This is similar to the situation in the Nordic countries before liberalization, where interest rates were controlled, there was credit rationing with a large lending-deposit spread (Figure 8 ), real rates of interest were low (Figure 4) , and stock and bond markets and foreign competition were kept at bay.
As a corollary to direct ªnancial market intervention and administrative measures, policymakers and regulators in China today have little experience in managing ªnancial liberalization. Monetary policy is largely based on quantitative regulations. This was also the case for the Nordics when they started on the road to ªnancial liberalization in the 1980s.
Finally, on the external side, both China and the Nordics are open economies on the current account. China's export share as a percentage of GDP in recent years has been similar to that of the Nordic countries in the early 1980s (i.e., around 25-30 percent of GDP). From a historical perspective, the Nordics have beneªtted from participating in the global economy, building their high standard of living on international trade and openness-a strategy that is similar to the case of China today. China's capital account is not fully liberalized, but the same was true for Finland, Norway, and Sweden before liberalization. 
The case for learning lessons for China
We suggest a number of reasons to support our case for drawing lessons for China from the Nordic experience of ªnancial liberalization.
First of all, although the major differences between China and Scandinavia need to be borne in mind when lessons are being identiªed, the two economies share important characteristics as far as the state of the economy at the start of the process of ªnancial deregulation is concerned: namely, a bank-dominated ªnancial system, strong credit controls, lack of risk management experience, lack of ªnancial knowledge, and exchange controls, while being open on the current account. As a result, the incentives and processes unleashed by ªnancial liberalization are likely to be similar.
Second, the Nordic reform experience is easily accessible and imparts lessons of a general nature. The failures and mistakes that occurred during the ªnancial liberalization in the Nordic countries have been openly revealed by memoirs and comments published by politicians and bankers involved in the process, by government reports, and by academic studies. The message from this literature may help Chinese policymakers understand the dangers of ªnancial liberalization and thus minimize the risks of managing ªnancial deregulation.
Third, the history of boom-bust cycles across countries, across time, and across various institutional frameworks suggests that ªnancial crises possess some general characteristics. As long as there is a credit market, there will be a risk of boom-bust cycles. The issue for China is not to completely avoid boom-bust patterns (that is an impossible task) but to understand how boom-bust cycles interact with the ªnancial liberalization process, how loose monetary policy may fuel credit booms, and how to read the onset of a coming credit boom, so as to understand the policy actions that would minimize the cost of ªnancial liberalization. A careful analysis of the record of ªnancial deregulation and boom-bust cycles in the Nordic countries, as well as in other countries, can provide such lessons for China.
Fourth, the successful record of Denmark demonstrates that ªnancial opening does not need to end in a deep crisis, as long as the right macroeconomic and regulatory policies are in place. The Danish exception thus holds an important lesson for China as well.
Fifth, the Nordic countries maintained consensus around the policies adopted to handle the ªnancial crisis, as well as consensus around an open ªnancial system after the ªnancial crisis. Thus the crisis did not give rise to a political backlash against ªnancial openness. Because Chinese policymakers are concerned with keeping social tensions to a minimum, the Nordics' record may be of particular interest on this account.
Sixth, the ªnancial reforms in the Nordics was part of a movement towards economic liberalization, catching up with the rest of Europe, as well as a way of moving them towards closer European economic integration. China is in a similar phase of transition towards a more open economy.
Lessons for China from Scandinavia
This section draws out six lessons from the Nordic experience of ªnancial liberalization that we regard as being of interest for China. Of course, lesson-drawing is not an exact science. We do not claim to have made an unbiased selection, but merely to have focused on those features we believe are most relevant for China today. 
Lesson 1: The dangers of financial ignorance
The Nordic episodes illustrate the dangers of a lack of knowledge about the processes set in motion by ªnancial liberalization and ªnancial integration. If such knowledge is not at hand, then the proper response before, during, and after ªnancial liberalization is not likely to be forthcoming. When ªnancial deregulation began in Scandinavia, decision makers in all segments of society were trapped in a pattern of thinking that made little or no allowance for ªnancially driven booms, busts, and crises. This was the case of policymakers in the central banks and the ministries of ªnance, as well as of forecasters of future economic developments, ªnancial regulators, the economics profession, bankers and other actors in the ªnancial system, and of the public at large.
The system of ªnancial controls and regulations that had prevented the workings of ªnancial markets since World War II created widespread ªnancial ignorance or illiteracy. For this reason, when the process of ªnancial liberalization started in the 1980s, the behavior established during many decades of ªnancial repression was continued without an understanding that the old risk-free world was rapidly being replaced by a new, and ªnancially more risky world. Financial ignorance thus accounts for much of the behavior that gave rise to the ªnancial crisis.
Decision makers in charge of monetary and ªscal policies commonly viewed steps towards ªnancial deregulation in the mid 1980s as technical adjustments that were of no major consequence for aggregate economic performance. In addition, the ªrst impact of ªnancial liberalization was a lending boom with rising consumption and wealth, which was appreciated by the parties in political power. Thus no major counteracting stabilization policy measures were taken until it was too late. Similarly, ªnancial regulators were unaware of the risks created by ªnancial deregulation and lax monetary and ªscal policies and took no effective action to slow the process of credit growth.
Ofªcial forecasts, made both within Scandinavia and by international organizations, failed to identify the boom-bust cycle. The errors in forecasts made at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s were much larger than the average errors for the postwar period. Forecast errors emerged during both the boom and the bust phases of the cycle. At the end of the 1980s, when the economy was overheated, it took longer than expected for it to cool down. When the bust and downturn came, it was much deeper than expected, and once again the recovery from the crisis was faster than most commentators had anticipated. The systematic collective bias in forecast performance, reºecting the lack of knowledge by professional forecasters about ªnancial events, contributed to serious policy mistakes.
Economists at universities in Scandinavia were caught up in a Keynesian world of ºow variables, being unfamiliar with the wealth, portfolio, and balance sheet effects created by ªnancial liberalization and changes in real interest rates. As a rule, economists were in favor of ªnancial liberalization. They viewed deregulation as part of a supply-side approach aimed at improving growth performance, with little understanding of the imbalances and dangers that ªnancial deregulation could bring about if it were not combined with proper countermeasures such as more restrictive monetary and ªscal policies. Thus few warnings emerged from the economics profession at a time when such advice would have been most appropriate.
Bankers and other actors on ªnancial markets were ignorant of the change in the rules of the game. They lacked an understanding of the workings of unregulated ªnancial markets because they had only experienced a ªnancially closed and strongly regulated economy, where ªnancial risks were exceptionally limited. The same held for private individuals and ªrms. As soon as credit became freely available, borrowers rapidly turned to the ªnancial sector to enter deep into debt. Thus the credit boom was fuelled by lenders and borrowers with little understanding of the risks of unsustainable loan expansion.
The policy lesson for China is simple. A thorough analytical and factual understanding of the consequences of a move towards ªnancial integration, and of the workings of unfettered ªnancial markets, is crucial to making ªnancial liberalization and subsequent ªnancial integration successful. Financial knowledge should be as widely disseminated as possible: among domestic policymakers, regulators, ofªcial and private forecasters, economists, ªnancial sector participants and, most importantly, among the public at large. When China deregulates its ªnancial markets in the future, new ªnancial risks are likely to build up through the emergence of new instruments and techniques that did not exist in the Nordics in the 1980s. Of course these cannot be predicted today, but ªnancial literacy, including proper learning from other countries, can help in the design of a balanced response to ªnancial integration. The history of ªnancial crisis suggests that particular attention should be paid to the growth of credit aggregates, as credit is the main driver of boom-bust cycles. Moreover, relatively stable interest rate margins, as in the case of the Nordics, may have masked the growing risks that banks were actually taking in the competition for market shares, when they ventured into new markets and product segments where they had scant experience of risk management.
Lesson 2: The importance of sequencing reforms to avoid pro-cyclicality
The Nordic record of ªnancial liberalization demonstrates that the sequencing of ªnancial reforms, internally and externally, on the route to ªnancial liberalization is of utmost importance in determining macroeconomic performance. It is the key to the ruinous record of Finland and Sweden. To summarize, ªnancial markets were ªrst deregulated internally in the mid 1980s, which set off a sharp lending boom, fu-elled by an inºow of capital, while outºows were prevented by capital controls. Later, at the end of the 1980s, ªnancial markets were externally deregulated, allowing an outºow of capital, while the central banks chose to defend the pegged exchange rate with high interest rates. The pegged exchange rate was then abandoned when the crisis reached its peak. An earlier ºoating or adjustment of the peg could have dampened the boom-bust pattern-or even eliminated it if ªnancial liberalization had simultaneously been combined with a ºoating rate.
First of all, ªnancial liberalization under given tax incentives meant that, for the three crisis-ridden Nordic countries, real after-tax interest rates were initially kept at a low level through favorable taxation of interest payments on loans. Taxation, however, was changed in various stages in all three countries, which raised real after-tax interest rates signiªcantly. Tax rules thus made a procyclical contribution, fuelling the boom and exacerbating the bust. In a more appropriate sequencing, taxation would have been reformed at an early stage of the ªnancial liberalization process.
Second, by maintaining and defending the pegged rate of their currencies, the Nordic countries created a strongly procyclical monetary policy both during and after ªnancial liberalization. During the boom phase, interest rates could not be raised to counter the boom, because that would have increased capital inºows and thus strengthened the credit boom. Once the cycle started to turn downwards, the pegged exchange rate had to be defended by raising the domestic interest rates, thus contributing to the downturn. Eventually, the defense of the peg made the domestic crisis so deep that the peg had to be abandoned. This happened in the autumn of 1992: in September in Finland, in November in Sweden, and in December in Norway.
Third, ªscal policy-that is, the design of taxes and government expendituresplayed a key role in the process of ªnancial liberalization. During the boom phase, it was commonly pro-cyclical. Although the ªscal authorities apparently believed that ªscal policy was contractionary because budget surpluses were being registered, these surpluses were too small to counterbalance the boom. Fiscal policy should therefore have been much tighter. During the bust phase, primarily due to the workings of automatic stabilizers, budget deªcits expanded extremely rapidly. Now, the rise in deªcits prompted far-reaching policy measures to reduce government expenditures and raise taxes in Finland and Sweden, thereby making the recession deeper.
The policy lesson for China is that policymakers should consider the macroeconomic or cyclical consequences of structural changes in regulation and taxes, of the exchange rate regime, and of the ªscal regime. Tax reforms may be highly recommendable as part of a policy for improved growth and efªciency, but they may also have undesirable effects when interacting with other developments. Thus policymakers should pay careful attention to initial conditions when changing prevailing ªnancial regulations and schemes of taxation. The same holds for the potential procyclicality of the workings of the exchange rate regime. Most prominently, the existence of a pegged but adjustable exchange rate can easily amplify cyclical developments during a process of ªnancial liberalization, thus creating a conºict between internal and external stability. This lesson is illustrated not only by the Nordics, but also by the experience of the crisis in many other countries.
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Concerning China, it may be prudent to focus reforms initially on the domestic front so as to strengthen the ªnancial system before it is exposed to international competitive forces. Moving beyond this initial phase, the currency crises in Scandinavia show that risks arising from external opening can be mitigated by allowing greater exchange rate ºexibility before, or at least in conjunction with, capital account opening. Not only can monetary policy effectiveness be maintained to a greater extent, but also banks have stronger incentives to control the currency risks arising from cross-border ªnancial ºows. As a result, the pro-cyclical forces inherent in providing ªnancial institutions with a greater degree of freedom can be tamed. Moreover, in terms of timing, the Nordic experience shows that the capital account should be opened when inºow or outºow pressures arising from the position in the economic cycle are minimal.
Lesson 3: The limits of micro-prudential financial supervision
Prior to the ªnancial deregulation in the mid 1980s, the system of ªnancial supervision was well developed in Finland, Norway, and Sweden, albeit with a focus on correct accounting. There were no weak banks, no "crony banking," no dubious links between banks and industrial companies, political parties, or private families reºecting nepotism and corruption. In addition, no banks were dependent on state subsidies or state support. Still, in spite of the existing ªnancial supervision, the ªnancial crises of the early 1990s brought the entire banking system close to collapse, prompting major government ªnancial intervention, and forcing several banks into bankruptcy or into obtaining support through public funds.
The policy lesson for China is that conventional micro-prudential ªnancial supervision, adopted to monitor tightly regulated ªnancial institutions, is not up to the task of preventing a deep crisis from developing within the ªnancial system. The forces of boom and bust unleashed among the Nordics were simply too strong to be neutralized by such ªnancial supervision. 36 Thus it is imperative to reform the supervisory system prior to or simultaneously with ªnancial liberalization. Financial supervision should be based on a macro-prudential approach. 37 Still, no ªnancial supervision, however adequate and efªcient, can prevent the emergence of a systemic ªnancial crisis of the type that hit the Nordic countries in the early 1990s if the proper macroeconomic policies are not in place.
Lesson 4: The benefits of a flexible and cautious approach
The Nordic countries-with the exception of Denmark-applied a "big bang" approach to ªnancial liberalization, thus creating a strong boom-bust cycle by "opening the ºoodgates." Also, the Nordic economies were all market-based systems when they were ªnancially liberated. China starts from a different position, that of an economy in transition, which makes the process more complicated and therefore riskier.
The lesson is that China should avoid a "big bang" approach to ªnancial liberalization as applied by the Nordics, and should instead adopt a cautious approach by liberalizing in small steps. This strategy will allow time to learn from mistakes and provide the opportunity to backtrack if signs of major tensions develop, thereby minimizing the risk of ªnancial turmoil. Also, the Nordics had no early warning system when they started on the road towards ªnancial liberalization. The lesson for China is to put such a system in place prior to full liberalization.
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In addition to monitoring emerging risks, a cautious and ºexible approach also includes the option to respond quickly and decisively if a ªnancial crisis develops. In the case of the Nordics, the process of ªnancial liberalization set off a chain of events that threatened to wipe out the entire equity of many banks. At that stage, far-reaching steps were taken in Finland to support the banking system; the savings bank group was taken over by the government. In Norway, the three biggest banks were nationalized, eliminating private ownership completely. offered a blanket assurance for claims on Swedish commercial banks, nationalized the two insolvent banks, and set up asset management corporations to take over the bad assets of the remaining commercial banks.
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The Swedish approach is commonly praised for being swift and resolute. 40 It prevented bank runs; it maintained the solvent commercial banks in private ownership and allowed banks to continue ªnancial intermediation, averting any credit crunch; it kept moral hazard for shareholders at bay, and it was transparent. Eventually, the bad assets taken over by the asset management corporations turned out to be something of a ªnancial success once the economy had recovered; at least the losses turned out to be much smaller than initially expected.
The policy lesson for China is clear in a case where deregulation contributes to a crisis. Rapid, transparent, and determined government action to maintain public conªdence in the strength of the banking system reduces the impact of a ªnancial crisis, dampens any credit crunch, and allows for a rapid recovery of the ªnancial system and thus of the real economy.
There is an additional reason for China to be cautious. The Nordic countries are small economies with stable political traditions. They can experiment and have failures, without this leading to international consequences. China, in contrast, is an economic giant. If China makes serious policy mistakes when liberalizing its ªnan-cial system, this may have a strong negative effect upon the rest of the world, in particular on other East Asian countries, not to mention far-reaching economic and political effects within China.
Although the pace of reform should be gradual, it should also be steady. The Nordic countries did not halt or reverse their liberalization process in response to the crisis. The lesson in this for China is that gradualism should be tempered by the importance of avoiding a stop-go policy. Once the momentum for a more competitive and open ªnancial system is created, halting or doing a U-turn could entail higher costs than continuing onwards with appropriate modiªcations that reºect actual learning.
Lesson 5: Financial liberalization can lead to costly crises, but it does not have to
The loss in output and industrial production in the early 1990s is large compared with the outcome of previous major crises among the Nordics, as Table 2 shows.
There is no event of a similar magnitude in the entire post-World War II period. It matches the depression of the 1930s, commonly regarded as the most severe crisis of the 20th century. Indeed, the ªnancial crisis of the early 1990s is unique. It represents a sharp break with the business cycle pattern post-World War II, particularly in Finland and Sweden.
The fact that Finland, Norway, and Sweden ended up in a deep crisis after ªnancial liberalization makes it tempting to conclude that ªnancial liberalization is bound to lead to crisis and can only be attained at a high cost to society. The Nordic experience demonstrates that such a conclusion is incorrect. The record of Denmark shows ªnancial liberalization can be implemented without creating a sharp boom-bust pattern.
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The policy lesson for China is that it is possible to carry out ªnancial liberalization without causing a dramatic crisis across the whole economy. This requires, as stressed in the previous lessons herein, that a general understanding of the processes unleashed by ªnancial deregulation exists, that the authorities maintain a proper timing of the process of deregulation, that ªnancial supervision is working, and that ªnancial liberalization is conducted in a ºexible and cautious manner.
Lesson 6: Financial liberalization has long-run benefits
The Nordic experience demonstrates that ªnancial liberalization and the process of intensiªed ªnancial integration that started once the barriers for cross-border ªnancial ºows were eliminated do have long-run beneªcial effects on the conduct of stabilization policies and on the growth potential of the economy.
For China, the long-run effects of ªnancial liberalization are also most likely to be highly beneªcial on its way to becoming the biggest economy in the world. A properly functioning ªnancial system is a key determinant of growth and transformation. This would also give China a greater degree of freedom in determining the strategy for its monetary policy. With a market-oriented ªnancial system, monetary policy can be focused to a larger extent than at present on domestic conditions. In future, the Chinese currency will be among the major reserve currencies. For this to happen, China must have a ªnancial system that is open to the world.
There are risks of postponing adjustment to an open ªnancial system. The costs of ªnancial underdevelopment in the form of misallocation of credit, inferior stabilization policies, and the build-up of ªnancial imbalances should also ªgure high on the agenda. The status quo is a costly state. This strengthens the case for speeding up the ªnancial opening of China.
The lesson here is simple. By opening up to international trade in recent decades, China has been surªng the global economy with success so far-but not to the full extent. The Nordic economies followed a similar strategy both before and after international ªnancial integration. This suggests that ªnancial opening is not a threat to the long-run growth performance of China.
Conclusions
This paper has identiªed a set of policy lessons or policy recommendations from the experience of the process of ªnancial liberalization, and of the ensuing ªnancial crisis and recovery, in Scandinavia during the period 1985-2000 that are deemed relevant for China today. These are as follows: (1) ªnancial liberalization can be implemented without creating a deep ªnancial crisis; (2) a thorough understanding by policymakers and ªnancial market participants of the behavioral and institutional linkages within the ªnancial system and to the rest of the economy and the workings of open ªnancial markets is central to making ªnancial liberalization successful; (3) policymakers should pay careful attention to initial conditions concerning regulation, taxes, and exchange rate arrangements when moving towards ªnancial openness; (4) the ªnancial supervisory system should be reformed prior to or simultaneously with ªnancial liberalization in particular focusing on macroprudential issues; (5) a "big bang" approach to ªnancial liberalization as applied by the Nordics should be avoided, preferring instead a cautious approach by liberalizing in small, but substantive steps; and (6) the long-run effects of ªnancial liberalization are most likely to be highly beneªcial for China. A properly functioning ªnancial system is a key determinant of growth and transformation. Maintaining the present status quo of ªnancial underdevelopment brings high costs and the risk of abrupt-and thus damaging-changes in the future.
These policy recommendations should be viewed as a package, because they are closely related. It is not sufªcient to select a few and ignore the others. The approach to ªnancial reform should be a wide one focusing on systemic risks; otherwise, there is a great risk that it will create problems along the road to ªnancial openness.
Financial reform and liberalization strike us as urgent issues, as China's transition to a market-based economy is far from completed. Given the complexity of the challenges ahead, arising from the intricate interdependencies with progress in other areas of reform and the need for maintaining stability, future ªnancial reforms need to strike a careful balance between being gradual and substantive.
Nevertheless, ªnancial liberalization is still a risky venture. The short-run costs and risks must be compared with the long-run beneªts. The costs or risks can be minimized if China is ready to learn the lessons from countries that have undergone ªnancial liberalization-and the Nordics provide valuable lessons for China on this account.
Last, amid the present GFC there is growing doubt about the beneªts of ªnancial opening and ªnancial liberalization. The Nordic experience does provide one clearcut conclusion on this issue. None of the three Nordic countries that suffered the huge costs of ªnancial crisis has taken steps to return to ªnancial autarchy, to close its borders for capital ºows, or otherwise to turn the clock back. This suggests that the beneªts of ªnancial integration outweigh its costs, even when those costs turn out to be high for society in the short run.
